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ABSTRACT
This article summarizes the report of the Expert Panel on Business Innovation appointed by
the Council of Canadian Academies. The report presents a fresh look at innovation as an
economic process rather than primarily as a science and engineering activity. Noting that
Canada’s productivity has been falling further behind that of the United States and many
other advanced countries for the past 25 years, the report argues that lagging productivity
growth has been due to subpar innovation. Innovation is interpreted broadly to encompass
the day-to-day activites of all kinds of businesses looking for new or more efficient ways to
serve the needs of customers. The panel concludes that too many businesses in Canada are
technology followers, not leaders, and that a fresh discussion on innovation in Canada is
needed, one that focuses on the factors that influence adoption of innovation-based
business strategies.
INNOVATION — NEW OR BETTER ways of
doing valued things — is the creative capacity
to transform the imagined into the real. Inno-
vation matters for businesses because novel prod-
ucts and more efficient processes are the
principal means of making businesses more
competitive. It is through innovation that busi-
nesses find ways to generate more value from
existing resources. Innovation is, directly or
indirectly, the main driver of productivity
growth and is thus the principal source of
national prosperity. Canadians should therefore
be concerned in the face of evidence suggesting
that Canada’s business sector on the whole,
though with notable exceptions, is lagging in
innovation relative to many of our peer group
of economically advanced countries.
The question is “why.” If innovation is good
for business, why is Canadian business appar-
ently less committed to innovation than analysts
and policy-makers believe it should be? The
question has been asked for decades, yet the sit-
uation has not changed much in relative terms.
The causes of Canada’s innovation deficiency
must therefore run deep in the nature of the
economy, and perhaps in Canadian society as
well. To bring to bear a comprehensive contem-
porary analysis of the issue, the federal Minister
of Industry asked the Council of Canadian Acad-
emies to appoint a panel of business, labour and
academic experts (Box 1) to answer the following
questions:
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• How should the innovation performance of
Canadian firms be assessed?
• How innovative are Canadian firms, and
what do we know about their innovation
performance at a national, regional and sec-
tor level?
• Why is business demand for innovation
inputs (for example, research and develop-
ment, machinery and equipment, and skilled
workers) weaker in Canada than in many
other OECD countries?
• What are the contributing factors, and what
is the relative importance of these contrib-
uting factors?
The Context
The panel first met in November 2007, a time
when the Toronto Stock Exchange index was
nudging 14,000, oil was close to $100 a barrel, the
Canadian dollar was above par with the U.S. dollar,
economic growth was solid and the unemployment
rate was at a multi-decade low. But beneath the
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bullish daily headline data were worrisome longer-
term trends, particularly the persistently weak pro-
ductivity growth in Canada. Investment in lead-
ing-edge technology — especially related to
computers and communications — was lagging
significantly behind not only that of the United
States, but also many of the advanced countries
with which Canada compares itself. Business
spending on research and development as a share
of the economy was down 20 per cent from its 2001
peak at the end of the technology boom.
While the panel was completing its work in
late 2008 and early 2009, the world changed dra-
matically. Because the extent of the global eco-
nomic crisis, and its ultimate impact on Canada’s
economy and society, remains unknown, the
panel did not attempt to factor the crisis promi-
nently into its diagnosis of business innovation
in Canada. A longer-term perspective is needed
in any event since the symptoms of lagging inno-
vation are of very long standing. The panel
therefore focused its analysis primarily on long-
run phenomena, stretching across several ups
and downs of the economic cycle. Thus its find-
ings remain relevant notwithstanding the severe
contemporary shock to the global economy.
It is emphasized that the panel’s report is pri-
marily a diagnosis based on existing sources and
not a policy prescription, though it provides a
body of fact and informed opinion that is of pol-
icy relevance.
Innovation as an 
Economic Process
The panel approached innovation as an eco-
nomic process rather than as a primarily sci-
ence and engineering activity. The theme of
its analysis is the link between business strat-
egy and innovation activity, interpreted
broadly. An “invention” is not an innovation
until it has been implemented to a meaningful
extent. Moreover, innovation is not limited to
products but includes improved processes like
the assembly line, and new business models
like web-based commerce. Radical innova-
tions like the steam engine and the transistor
create entirely new markets. Much more prev-
alent is incremental innovation in established
markets in which goods and services are con-
tinuously improved — a process that is
responsible for the majority of labour produc-
tivity growth. These observations imply a
much broader conception of innovation than
the traditional R&D-centric views.
Canada has a serious productivity growth prob-
lem. Since 1984, relative labour productivity in
the business sector has fallen from more than 90
per cent of the U.S. level to about 76 per cent in
2007, a trend (Chart 1) that continued in 2008.
Over the 1985-2006 period, Canada’s average
labour productivity growth ranked 15th out of 18
of the larger and most advanced comparator
countries in the OECD (OECD, 2008b).
Canada was rapidly closing the productivity gap
with the United States until the early 1980s. The
strength of U.S. productivity growth, since the
mid-90s, is primarily associated with the produc-
tion and use of information and communications
technologies (ICT).
Chart 1
Relative Labour Productivity Levels in the Business Sector, 
1947-2007
(real GDP per hour Canada as per cent of U.S.)



































Chart 2 is a growth accounting decomposition
by Statistics Canada comparing labour productiv-
ity growth in the United States and Canada over
a 45-year period, 1961-2006. Productivity
growth is analyzed as a weighted sum of (i)
improvement in the “quality” of the labour force
(based primarily on higher educational attain-
ment and more employment experience); (ii)
growth of capital services per hour worked (“cap-
ital deepening”) and (iii) the residual, multifactor
productivity (MFP) growth, which broadly
reflects the effectiveness with which labour and
capital are combined in the economy. Chart 2
shows that Canada’s relative productivity growth
weakness is not due to comparative shortcomings
in its workforce. Neither, for the most part, does
it reflect inadequate capital investment though, as
will be described subsequently, business invest-
ment in information and communications tech-
nology has been especially weak. The
decomposition demonstrates clearly that Can-
ada’s poor productivity growth is due mainly to
the weak growth of MFP. In fact, MFP growth in
Canada has lagged behind that of the United
States for as long as comparable measurements
have been made. Studies by the OECD also show
that Canada’s MFP growth, at least since the mid-
1980s, has been among the weakest in its peer
group of economically advanced countries.
The significance of multifactor 
productivity
Intuitively, changes in MFP measure that por-
tion of labour productivity growth that can not
be accounted for by measured growth of both
capital intensity and the quality of the work-
force. Most significant for this discussion is that
MFP growth contains the macroeconomic signature
of aggregate business innovation — the extraction
of increasing value from inputs of capital and
labour through inventive activity. Two examples
will illustrate:
• Consider the addition of a drive-through
window in a fast food outlet. A small amount
of construction and one or two extra servers
could substantially increase sales volume by
expanding the effective “seating capacity” of
the restaurant, and, more importantly, by
increasing service convenience and thereby
attracting more customers. After accounting
for the modest capital cost of installing the
Chart 2
Accounting for Labour Productivity Growth in Canada, 
1961-2006
(average annual growth rates, per cent)
Note: Labour productivity growth can be accounted for by increasing capital
intensity, improvement in workforce skills, and a residual called multifac-
tor productivity (MFP) — which broadly reflects the effectiveness with
which labour and capital are used. Growth rates in the top panel are the
sum of contributions of the factors in the bottom three panels. The time
periods cover the total 45 year interval (leftmost bars) and two sub-periods
when Canada was closing the productivity gap (roughly 1961 to 1980) and
falling behind (roughly 1980-2006).
Source: Baldwin and Gu (2007).INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 55
drive-through window and some extra
labour, the remainder of the increased out-
put is chalked up to MFP growth.
• Consider a sales force in the field before the
advent of the cellphone or, better yet, the
BlackBerry. Today’s relatively inexpensive
wireless capital equipment has amplified
greatly the value of each field employee, not
only through more efficient allocation of
time but also through more timely and co-
ordinated service for customers. While
some of the added value comes from new
investment in equipment, most is measured
as an increase in MFP.
Micro-examples like these can be multiplied
endlessly. In each case, we see an innovation that
may be based on science and technology (e.g. the
BlackBerry) or on some very simple engineering
combined with entrepreneurial insight (e.g., the
drive-through window). The economic impact
of thousands upon thousands of such innova-
tions, large and small, is huge.
There is an important interaction between
new capital investment (which ‘‘embodies”
innovation) and MFP since successive genera-
tions of capital induce complementary, and
often highly innovative, changes in the organi-
zation of work and the training of employees —
e.g. as the adoption of computer and communi-
cations technologies has done, or as the electric
motor did in an earlier era. Thus the distinction
between the component of productivity growth
ascribed to more and better capital, and the
component ascribed to MFP, can be somewhat
artificial. The impact of innovation on produc-
tivity growth enters jointly through both chan-
nels (Rao, Tang and Wang, 2008).
Since MFP is the residual after improve-
ments in labour quality and capital intensity
have been accounted for, it reflects all other
factors that affect labour productivity. So the
innovation signal in MFP growth comes mixed
with a lot of “noise”. These other confounding
factors include, prominently, changes in capac-
ity utilization caused by booms and recessions,
and changes in economies of scale that might
be due to opening up of big new markets. The
business cycle effect averages out over suffi-
ciently long time periods, as in Chart 2. MFP
derived purely from scale effects might arise
from growing markets, as would typically occur
after trade liberalization (e.g. NAFTA). Cana-
dian MFP should have benefited from this
increased scale to a greater extent than the
United States has since the 1980s. Thus
changes in scale economies can not explain the
slower MFP growth in Canada — in fact, the
effect of scale economies since the 1980s would
be expected to be the opposite. The analysis
summarized in Chart 2 applies the same proce-
dures to both Canadian and U.S. data, mini-
mizing the effect (on estimates of differences in
growth rates) of methodological differences or
errors in model specification.
The panel concluded that the rate of MFP
growth over suitably long periods is primarily
due to business innovation — interpreted
broadly to include better organization of
work, improved business models, the efficient
incorporation of new technology, the payoff
from R&D and the insights of entrepreneurs.
Since the long-term analyses by Statistics
Canada (and also by the OECD) show that
Canada’s relatively poor productivity growth
is due almost entirely to weak MFP growth,
the panel concluded that Canada’s weak pro-
ductivity growth is largely due to weak business
innovation performance.
The Central Role of Business 
Strategy
Business strategy drives innovative behaviour.
Explaining business innovation performance in
Canada therefore comes down to explaining the
business strategy choices of Canadian firms. This
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activities themselves — e.g. inputs like R&D and
investment in M&E — to a focus instead on the fac-
tors that influence the choice of business strategy.
This reframing of the innovation puzzle is the most
important contribution of the panel’s analysis.
What are the factors that principally influence
firms in Canada to choose, or not to choose,
business strategies based around innovation?
The five factors that are, in the panel’s view, of
greatest importance are those at the top of Chart
3 which serves as the conceptual framework for
the panel’s analysis.
• Structural characteristics — For example, is
the firm in a sector of the economy that typ-
ically does little in-house innovation, rely-
ing instead on technology embodied in
Chart 3
Logic Map of the Business Innovation ProcessINTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 57
capital equipment and/or on production of
relatively standard goods or services? Or is
the firm foreign controlled with most inno-
vation originating in the home country?
• Competitive intensity  — Is the pressure
from competitors so intense that innova-
tion is needed to maintain profitability
and/or market share? This would be the
case in many export markets, and particu-
larly in those where technology or cus-
tomer requirements or tastes are
changing.
• Climate for new ventures — Is sophisticated
early-stage venture financing available? Are
there research universities nearby to provide
potential innovation partners and highly
trained graduates? Is there a local “ecosys-
tem” of supplier firms to help carry an inno-
vation from concept to success in the
market?
• Public policies — Are government policies in
respect of tax, regulations, targeted assis-
tance programs or public procurement
favourable to innovation, or not?
• Business ambition — Is the business dedicated
to market expansion and prepared to take
the required risks? Business ambition, in
this context, reflects the extent of entrepre-
neurship and drive.
Once a firm has decided on an innovation strat-
egy, it assembles the enabling inputs. These
include the appropriate mix of highly qualified
employees; investment in the necessary capital
equipment and training; an R&D program if
needed; and retention of consultants and various
external suppliers, including licensing arrange-
ments and partnerships with other firms. While
these inputs, and R&D spending in particular,
can be regarded as indicators of innovation, they
are actually the consequences of the degree of com-
mitment to innovation as a business strategy.
To the extent that Canadian businesses lag in
respect of innovation, the reasons lie primarily
in some combination of the primary influencing
factors outlined above. Business ambition will
be a key factor in almost every case. For would-
be radical innovators in new markets, the other
significant influencing factors will be the cli-
mate for new ventures and perhaps some sup-
portive public policies. For firms in established
markets, the innovation strategy choice is likely
to be most influenced by the state of competi-
tion, by specific features of public policy or by
some industry characteristic such as the firm’s
sector or its domicile of control.
For policy-makers, the concern is the extent
to which the factors that influence the innova-
tion strategies of businesses can be affected by
public policy. Clearly some can be — taxes, reg-
ulations, procurement, assistance programs, for-
eign investment rules and certain aspects of
competition. Policy has much less impact on fac-
tors such as industry structure and the ambition
of business leaders, though business attitude can
certainly be affected by competitive intensity,
which is amenable to policy influence.
The five key influencing factors in Chart 3 are
themselves influenced by certain long-standing
features of Canada’s economy, of which the two
most significant appear to be the following:
• Canada is “upstream” in many North
American industries. This positioning is
the result of the nation’s resource endow-
ment and development history as a com-
modity supplier and technology adopter.
Canada’s upstream position in many conti-
nentally integrated value chains limits con-
tact with ultimate end-customers — who are
a strong source of motivation and direction
for innovation — and shapes the nature of
business ambition in many sectors.
• Canada’s domestic market is relatively
small and geographically fragmented.
Small markets offer lower potential reward
for undertaking the risk of innovation and
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viding less incentive for a business to inno-
vate in order to survive. Of course, the
innovation success of countries like Finland
and Sweden shows that the disadvantage of a
small domestic market can be offset by a
strong orientation toward innovation-inten-
sive exports.
The following sections present a highly
abridged account of the panel’s analysis and
commentary on the five factors considered to




The effect of structural factors (particularly
sector mix and foreign ownership) on business
strategy choice is most readily seen through
analysis of the gaps between Canada and the
United States in respect of R&D spending and
ICT investment. Since the collapse of the tech-
nology boom in 2001, Canada’s business expen-
diture on R&D (BERD), expressed as a
percentage of GDP, has been declining (Chart
4). Although the gap between Canada and the
United States narrowed significantly between
the mid-1980s and the peak of the technology
boom, it has since begun to open up again.
Structural factors are part of the explanation of
the gap, but only part.
Sector mix
A sector by sector analysis of the overall
U.S.-Canada R&D gap (Table 1) shows that
generally lower Canadian R&D spending
within the same sectors in both the United
States and Canada accounts for a greater por-
tion of the gap (the precise share of which var-
ies from year to year) than does Canada’s
adverse sector mix — i.e., the greater weight
in Canada’s economy of resource-related and
other activities that have inherently low R&D
spending. (Resource-based industries do
invest heavily in innovation, though via the
indirect route of its embodiment in advanced
capital equipment.)
Chart 5 traces the evolution, by sector, of the
U.S.-Canada BERD intensity gap over 16 years
from 1987 through 2002 (the latest year for
which a reasonably complete sector breakdown
was available in the OECD data). The total gap
diminished from about 1.7 percentage points in
the 1988-91 period to about one percentage
point in 2001-02, though it has increased some-
what since then. The most significant drivers of
the long-run trend have been (i) a sharp reduc-
tion in the contribution of the manufacturing
sector to the Canada-U.S. gap; versus (ii) an
increasing gap in business services R&D (partic-
ularly wholesale and retail trade). The broad
shift of output and employment toward services,
and the application of ICT in service sectors, has
been occurring more rapidly in the United
States than in Canada.
Chart 4
Business Expenditure on Research and Development 
Intensity, 1981-2006
(BERD as per cent of GDP)
Note: BERD intensity in Canada declined by 20 per cent between 2001 and
2007 reflecting the pull back in Canada’s large telecom equipment sector.
The commitment of Finland to innovation-led growth accelerated sharply
in the wake of a severe banking crisis in 1991, exacerbated by weakness
in Finland’s traditional exports following the collapse of the USSR.
Source: OECD (2008a).INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 59
Foreign control
The extent of foreign control of several major
Canadian sectors is well known to be part of the
explanation for low R&D intensity — e.g.
accounting for very low Canadian R&D in the
automotive and chemicals industries. This
reflects the traditional tendency of global corpo-
rations to conduct most innovation activity near
Table 1
U.S.-Canada Business Expenditure on Research and Development Intensity Gap by Sector, 2002
1) Excludes agriculture, primary forestry and fishing and real estate services (largely the imputed value of owner-occupied housing). The
definition of Business GDP ($715 billion in 2002) differs from the Statistics Canada breakout for that sector ($873 billion in 2002) which
the panel believes to be largely due to real estate services.
2) The contribution to the gap is calculated as: “Sector share of BERD intensity times sector share of GDP” for the United States, minus
the analogous product for Canada. For example, for manufacturing the contribution is: (8.03 x .219)-(4.16 x .27)=0.634. Negative con-
tributions to the BI gap — i.e., those numbers in parentheses in the final column of the table — are associated with sectors where the
ratio of Canada’s BERD to total GDP exceeds that of the United States — i.e., sectors that reduce the gap.
3)  n.e.c. = not elsewhere classified.
4)  An omnibus group of subsectors (including precision instruments among others) that is not further broken down in the OECD database.
Data Source: Panel calculations based on the OECD STAN Database.
Sector Share of Nominal 
Business Sector GDP (%)
BERD Intensity 
(BI) 
Contribution to BI Gap 
(U.S.-Can)
Canada U.S. Canada U.S. GAP(2)
BUSINESS SECTOR (1) 100.0 100.0 1.87 2.90 1.034
Manufacturing 27.0 21.9 4.16 8.03 0.634
Motor vehicles and parts 3.4 1.7 1.88 13.41 0.166
Pharmaceuticals 0.5 1.0 27.17 21.16 0.066
Chemicals (excl. pharmaceuticals) 1.5 1.5 2.01 6.45 0.066
Office accounting and computing machinery 0.1 0.4 65.01 32.80 0.053
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.(3) 1.8 1.5 2.70 6.59 0.048
Food, beverages and tobacco 3.3 2.6 0.45 1.28 0.018
Aircraft and spacecraft 0.8 0.8 15.41 18.49 0.018
Rubber and plastics products 1.4 1.0 0.73 2.32 0.013
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.7 0.6 0.29 0.98 0.004
Electrical machinery & apparatus n.e.c. 0.4 0.6 7.20 5.46 (0.001)
Pulp & paper, paper products printing and publishing 4.1 3.2 1.29 1.52 (0.004)
Textiles, leather and footwear 0.9 0.7 1.44 0.53 (0.010)
Fabricated metal products 2.0 1.6 1.61 1.24 (0.011)
Basic metals 1.6 0.6 2.04 1.14 (0.025)
Radio, TV & communication equipment 0.7 1.1 53.67 29.52 (0.054)
Other manufacturing (4) 3.8 3.0 1.88 11.80 0.288
Business services 53.4 66.2 1.26 1.71 0.457
Wholesale and retail trade 17.1 20.5 0.53 1.83 0.285
Other business services 19.0 28.9 2.85 2.49 0.181
Transport and storage 6.2 4.6 0.10 0.11 (0.001)
Financial intermediation 11.0 12.3 0.33 0.23 (0.007)
Mining and quarrying 7.5 1.6 0.64 0.68 (0.037)
Utilities 4.0 3.2 0.46 0.06 (0.016)
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their headquarters. But foreign control does not
automatically imply low R&D activity. In fact,
foreign subsidiaries in several sectors — e.g.
pharmaceuticals and computers — have been
major contributors to Canadian R&D and have
had R&D intensities that actually exceed the
U.S. average for these sectors. Moreover, if the
foreign-controlled facilities were not here, there
is no guarantee that Canada would have devel-
oped a “replacement set” of domestically owned
R&D performers. Analyses of individual firms,
based on R&D spending data and innovation
surveys, reveal a common pattern and produce a
three-tiered structure (relative to ownership) of
R&D and innovation behaviour in Canada
(Baldwin and Gu, 2005):
• Canadian-owned multinationals are the
most likely to engage in product innovation
and R&D spending.
• Canadian subsidiaries of foreign multina-
tionals are second, with generally lower
R&D intensity than Canadian-owned mul-
tinationals, but higher than purely domestic
Canadian firms.
• Canadian firms with only domestic opera-
tions have both the lowest incidence of
R&D spending and the lowest BERD
intensity.
This underlines the fact that Canada’s fail-
ure to develop a greater number of innovative
Canadian-based multinationals has been a key
contributor to the country’s overall R&D
weakness.
Investment in machinery 
and equipment
Investment in machinery and equipment
(M&E) is a principal channel through which
Chart 5
Evolution of the U.S.-Canada BERD Intensity Gap, 1987-2002
(percentage point)
* BERD Intensity = Business Expenditure on R&D as a per cent of GDP.
Note: This chart traces the evolution of the most important sectoral components of the R&D intensity gap. The nar-
rowing of the manufacturing gap (at least through 2002) has been due entirely to the aerospace sector as the U.S.
industry down-sized after the Cold War and due to commercial competition from Airbus. The business services gap
has meanwhile widened since the mid-90s. Much more work is needed to improve data on sub-sectors of business
services.
Source: Panel calculations based on the OECD STAN database.INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 61













innovation drives productivity growth because
such investment “embodies” the prior innova-
tion of producers of capital goods, including
software. M&E investment also stimulates inno-
vative changes in processes and work organiza-
tion to take best advantage of the new capital.
(The productivity improvement resulting from
such changes is captured statistically within
MFP growth.) Investment in M&E (as a per-
centage of GDP) by Canadian business has not
always lagged the United States as has been the
case with R&D, though a gap has opened up
since the early 1990s (Chart 6). The M&E
investment gap has been mostly due to Canada’s
persistently weaker investment in ICT. Average
ICT investment per worker in Canada was only
about 60 per cent of the U.S. level in 2007. This
is a serious shortcoming since the production
and application of ICT have been the key drivers
of innovation and resulting productivity growth
in the United States and several other countries.
Empirical studies suggest that only about 20
per cent of the U.S.-Canada gap in ICT invest-
ment can be explained by structural characteris-
tics related to sector mix and firm-size
distribution. Further study is needed to deter-
mine definitively the other factors that account
for this perplexing gap. For now, it can only be
said that relatively low ICT adoption is consistent
with a view that Canadian businesses on the
whole, but always with notable exceptions, are
technology followers, not leaders (Sharpe, 2005).
Competitive Intensity
In the 1940s Joseph Schumpeter argued that
large firms with market power were more likely
to innovate than small firms. Almost all of the
recent empirical analysis contradicts Schum-
peter and shows that (i) too much concentration
inhibits innovation by removing the incentive
created by competitive rivalry, and (ii) small
firms with specialized expertise can be the most
innovative.
Is the state of competition in Canada a signif-
icant cause of the country’s weak productivity
and innovation performance? The evidence
does not permit a definitive answer in view of (i)
the difficulty in measuring the intensity of com-
petition; and (ii) the great variety of market situ-
ations throughout the economy, some of which
are intensely competitive and others not. The
following general observations are germane.
Export-oriented Sectors: For sectors where the
market for the product is North American or
global, the competitive intensity faced by Cana-
dian firms is essentially identical to that faced by
competitors in other countries, and most indica-
tors suggest that Canadian firms achieve compa-
rable levels of innovation and competitiveness.
Assessments of innovation activity at the firm
level demonstrate that exporting firms are more
likely to invest in R&D and to manifest innova-
tive behaviour (Baldwin and Gu, 2004).
Chart 6
Business Sector M&E Investment Intensity, 1987-2007
(per cent of nominal GDP)
Note: Since ICT prices per unit of performance have fallen substantially (espe-
cially for microelectronics and optical communications), the performance-
adjusted “volume” of ICT investment would be much greater than the chart
suggests. Note that Canada’s non-ICT investment ratio increased from 1993
to 1998, despite Canadian dollar weakness (which increased the cost of
imported capital goods), and has been flat to declining since 2002 even as
the dollar strengthened.
Source: Centre for the Study of Living Standards (2008b).62 NUMBER 18, SPRING 2009 
Sectors Where Competition is Curtailed: There
are some important sectors in Canada — e.g. tele-
communications services, broadcasting, air trans-
port and certain agri-foods — where regulations
effectively curtail foreign entrants, thus limiting
competition. Innovation tends to be dampened in
those situations than might otherwise be the case
because there is very little incentive for the well-
established incumbents to compete for domestic
market share via innovation.
Indirect Evidence of Competitive Intensity: There
is a great deal of anecdotal evidence that the
intensity of competition in the U.S. domestic
market is far greater than in comparable sectors
in Canada. For example, the generally lower
level of business profit (relative to the size of the
economy) in the United States as compared with
Canada is indirect evidence of stiffer competi-
tion in the U.S. market.
The Effect of Canada’s Market Size: The rela-
tively small size of Canada’s domestic market —
made even smaller by regional fragmentation —
tends to limit both competitive intensity and the
returns to innovation in domestic sectors, which
underlines the importance of increasing Can-
ada’s presence in global export markets for inno-
vation-intensive goods and services. Innovation
is needed to move from a domestic to a global
growth strategy. Reciprocally, a heavy invest-
ment in innovation usually requires Canadian
businesses to go for the scale of global markets.
Canadian businesses, on the whole, have so far
failed to aggressively grasp the opportunities
created by globalization, a shortcoming that is
demonstrated by the relative lack of innovation-
oriented Canadian-based multinationals.
The Climate For New Ventures
New ventures are the “green shoots” of the
innovation system, bringing new ideas to market
and creating new competition. Despite some
dynamic clusters — such as in Waterloo and in
the largest Canadian cities — Canada needs to do
better in creating the conditions to enable more
of the country’s impressive number of startups to
become viable, growing businesses still based in
Canada. The following three key conditions
determine the quality of the environment in Can-
ada for the support of such businesses.
Financing new ventures
A vibrant “angel investor” community is the
key to bridging the “valley of death” that
separates a promising idea from a viable
startup business. (Angels are produced when
innovative entrepreneurs succeed and thus
generate both the financial resources and the
experienced mentors to stimulate or guide a
new generation of innovators.) The limited
data available on “informal” investment
sources in Canada suggest that they are much
less extensive, in relative terms, than
comparable sources in the United States.
Canadian governments have sought to address
the early-stage gap in financing through
various initiatives. For example, the Business
Development Bank of Canada has been
directing a growing share of its resources to
seed-stage and startup companies. While
helpful, such programs do not fill other
critically important aspects of the role of
angel investors — experience, contacts and
mentorship. To address that gap, a number of
incubation centres have been created to assist
small companies in their earliest stages of
growth — e.g., the Regional Economic
Intervention Fund established by the Quebec
government, the Centre for Drug Research
and Development in British Columbia and the
Accelerator Centre in Waterloo.
Venture capital (VC) is the post-angel stage
of funding when the basics of the business
proposition have already been developed and
larger sums are needed to ramp up to com-
mercial scale. There are reasons to be con-
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Canada. Fundraising for Canadian VC firms
has been falling — 2007 marked the fifth
decline in the prior six years. By contrast,
there were five consecutive years of growth in
the United States. The generally weak perfor-
mance of Canada’s VC industry (Chart 7) is
due to the fact that the industry is still rela-
tively young and thus has not yet developed
sufficient depth of experience to select and
mentor the best potential investment candi-
dates. It is also the case that the VC activities
of tax-advantaged Labour Sponsored Invest-
ment Funds (particularly outside Québec)
have negatively affected incentives and per-
formance in the industry.
There is no quick or easy fix for the Canadian
VC industry. Attracting sufficient capital to
become self-sustaining will require VC firms to
demonstrate they have the skills and experience
to generate acceptable returns. The dilemma is
that the industry requires access to sustainable
pools of investment capital to develop a critical
mass of investing skills. It is encouraging that
recent government policy initiatives at both the
provincial and federal levels have been designed
to support the growth of market-based venture
firms that will be judged, and will succeed or
not, based solely on their performance.
Commercializing university 
research
Canada’s record of university-based research
activity is strong and ranks among the best
among OECD countries, but the commercial-
ization of university research in Canada has
been, on the whole, disappointing. The princi-
pal causes relate to:
• the shortage of commercial receptor capac-
ity in Canada, due to the fact that relatively
few established firms in this country are
committed to research-based innovation
(and would therefore be in a position to
transact with universities)
• the relative weakness of new venture financ-
ing in Canada at both the angel and later VC
stages; and
• the inherent differences in the incentives
and professional values of the university and
the business firm, an issue not unique to
Canada.
The situation could be helped through better
infrastructure for identifying and mobilizing
potentially commercializable knowledge as it
emerges from university-based research. In many
cases this will involve well-designed partnerships
between universities and private-sector businesses
or government labs. The implication is that com-
mercialization of research-based ideas is more
likely to occur if the surrounding business environ-
ment is rich in firms that are committed to science
and technology-based innovation as a major busi-
ness objective — i.e., more “market pull” is needed
in Canada to complement “research push”.
Chart 7
Venture Capital Performance
Net Return* on Previous 10 Years for 2001-07
(per cent internal rate of return)
Note: The financial underperformance of aggregate VC investment in Canada
is clear. (Some individual funds may of course perform well). There has
been a decline in the 10-year rate of return for VC funds in both the United
States and Canada following the end of the tech boom, but the fall-off was
steeper in Canada and from a much lower level to begin with.
Source: Canadian Venture Capital Association (2007) and National Venture
Capital Association (2008).64 NUMBER 18, SPRING 2009 
Supporting innovation clusters
Innovation is fostered by the close personal and
supplier linkages that occur in certain geographic
concentrations, creating local innovation ecosys-
tems. Public policies designed to create such clus-
ters from scratch have yet to demonstrate much
success in Canada or elsewhere, though contin-
ued learning from initiatives like MaRS in Tor-
onto will aid the design of supportive policies.
The Waterloo success story is one good example
and shows that cluster development may require
both considerable time to mature and the conver-
gence of several favourable features that are typi-
cally specific to the locality.
The Public Policy 
Environment
Canada has provided a progressively more
encouraging environment for business inno-
vation, at least in respect of those factors over
which public policy has direct influence — for
example, prudent fiscal and monetary policies,
a trend of lower tax rates and support for uni-
versity research. But Canada’s other bench-
mark competitors are not standing still and
globalization and ICT are changing the way in
which a great deal of business innovation is
conducted. Most important, Canada’s innova-
tion performance is still far from where it
needs to be so there is still much work to do.
International trade
The general liberalizing trend of trade pol-
icy, until very recently at least, has favoured
innovation strategies both to counter import
competition and to take advantage of new
markets. The concern looking forward — par-
ticularly in view of the severe economic stress
in most countries — is the risk of increased
protectionism. This would reduce the size of
the addressable market for many Canadian
businesses and thus the potential return from
an investment in innovation. As a relatively
small open economy, Canada is particularly
exposed to the vicissitudes of global markets
and especially to conditions in the United
States. While Canada’s prudent macroeco-
nomic policy over the past 15 years has pro-
vided some capacity to absorb shocks, further
insulation depends on building a base of
export industries at the leading edge of inno-
vation in order to be among the last to lose
market share if customers retrench.
Human capital
Education and the quality of human capital is
one of Canada’s most significant strengths and
therefore offers little by way of explanation for
the long-term relative weakness in productivity
growth or business innovation. The federal gov-
ernment’s commitment to the support of univer-
sity research has been strong since the mid-to-
late 1990s, which has increased the supply of
leading-edge skills and, other things being
equal, made Canada a more attractive location
for innovative business. The competition from
China and India, among others, for knowledge-
intensive activity has meanwhile increased
sharply as those countries have also succeeded in
rapidly expanding their production of skilled
people. The accumulation of human capabilities
is a race without a finish line.
Of particular significance for innovation per-
formance is the fact that Canadian business
managers are, on average, not as well trained as
those in the United States. This education gap
may leave many Canadian managers less aware
than their U.S. counterparts of developments at
the leading edge of technology and business
practice, and thus less likely to choose business
strategies that emphasize innovation.
Regulation
The impact of regulatory policies is usually
sector-specific, thus few generalizations can
be made. Moreover, the effect of regulationINTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 65
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on business innovation may either be stultify-
ing or encouraging. Regulations often inspire
innovation to meet the rules (e.g. auto emis-
sion limits and fuel efficiency standards) or to
design around them (e.g. refrigerant substi-
tutes for CFCs to avoid ozone depletion). The
intensifying pressure on virtually all aspects of
the natural environment due to population
and economic growth in general, and energy
use in particular, requires an unprecedented
innovative response, elements of which will
need to be encouraged by well-designed regu-
lation in all countries. While Canada has some
companies that have been successful innova-
tors in various fields of environmental tech-
nology (e.g. fuel cells and wastewater
treatment), it has not generally been an area of
comparative global strength for Canada
despite this country’s outstanding research
competence in many fields of environmental
science (Committee on The State of Science
& Technology in Canada, 2006).
Taxation
Many studies over the years have pointed to a
relatively high rate of business taxation in Can-
ada, particularly as it affects the after-tax cost of
M&E investment. This reduced the incentive
for firms to accumulate M&E and, because of
the strong linkages among M&E, R&D and
innovation generally, would explain some part of
Canada’s weak productivity performance.
According to estimates by the C.D. Howe Insti-
tute, Canada’s marginal effective tax rate
(METR) for medium and large companies was
the highest in the OECD in 2005 and 2006,
though the comparable rate in the United States
was only slightly lower (Mintz, Chen,
Guillemette and Poschmann, 2005, Chen and
Mintz, 2008). The federal government has
meanwhile been steadily reducing corporate tax
rates of various kinds, and in Budget 2009 com-
mitted to continue with measures projected to
give Canada the G7’s lowest overall tax rate on
new investment by 2010.
R&D incentives: The Scientific Research and
Experimental Development (SR&ED) tax
incentive provides by far the largest direct finan-
cial support for business innovation in Canada
— representing about $4 billion of federal tax
foregone in 2007. Although there is good evi-
dence that the tax credit has a positive net bene-
fit (Parsons and Phillips, 2007), many business
leaders believe that the program should be
improved — e.g. by extending the “refundabil-
ity” of the credit beyond small businesses to
R&D performers of any size. While Canada’s
total government support for business R&D (tax
and direct spending combined) is somewhat
larger, relative to GDP, than that of the United
States and the United Kingdom, it is noteworthy
that Canada’s reliance on the tax assistance
channel to stimulate R&D is unusually heavy
(Chart 8). Although most countries have been
increasing the use of tax credits in their R&D
Chart 8
Government Funding of Business R&D*
(per cent of GDP)
* 2005 or last available year.
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support programs, more evaluation is needed to
determine the right mix.
Sector strategies
The ICT sector, among others such as aero-
space, provides several examples of the govern-
ment’s catalytic role in enabling innovative
activities to take root and build scale to the point
where commercial viability emerges. This initi-
ating influence has taken many forms — early
procurement (for example, stimulating IBM’s
substantial presence in Canada); public-private
commercial partnerships in support of a national
mission (for example, creation of Telesat in
1969); and research support through targeted
university funding and sector-oriented govern-
ment R&D facilities and programs.
Business Ambition
The intangibles that make up Canada’s busi-
ness culture are believed by many to reduce the
supply of entrepreneurial talent, the appetite for
risk, the urge to grow and the propensity to
innovate. This issue is frequently the subject of
surveys and commentaries in which there are
two contradictory threads. One is based on sur-
veys of the general population and contends that
Canadians are not that much different from
Americans when it comes to attitudes regarding
risk and entrepreneurship, and therefore any
explanation of innovation shortcomings based
on public attitude and “business culture” is a red
herring (Institute for Competitiveness and Pros-
perity, 2003).
A contrary view, often voiced by members of
the Canadian business community, usually based
on personal experience, is that there is an inbred
propensity among U.S. business people to maxi-
mize the economic heft of their enterprise — to
always go for growth. In Canada and Europe,
“good enough” appears more often to be
reached at a lower level. Put another way, there
appears to be a deficiency of business ambition
in Canada. Too many successful Canadian busi-
nesses would rather behave like an “income
trust” than like a “venture capitalist”. On the
other hand, Canadians have been bold and
entrepreneurial in domains where the country
has had long experience and deep knowledge
flowing from the particular opportunities and
challenges the country has faced — mineral
exploration and project engineering being good
examples. Canadian business, on the whole, has
acquired much less experience at the frontiers of
science and technology, and has thus been less
able to gauge the risks and opportunities in
many of these domains. Fewer Canadian compa-
nies have therefore been prepared to adopt strat-
egies based on technological innovation.
Related to this is a persistent concern that too
many innovative startups fail to mature in Can-
ada with the most promising often acquired and
eventually relocated to the United States. The
greater supply and sophistication of venture
capital investors in the United States and imme-
diate proximity to a larger market can be irre-
sistible attractions for young, technology-based
firms. This underlines the importance of
improving the climate for new ventures as dis-
cussed earlier.
The key question is whether Canadian busi-
nesses are aggressive enough and sufficiently
outward-looking to compete in global markets
beyond the huge and accessible U.S. market?
Clearly, the many Canadians who have built suc-
cessful global businesses have what it takes. But
the issue is whether there are enough of them to
ensure the long-term prosperity of the entire
economy. The panel’s view is that today, there
are not. This is not due to any lack of innate
capacities of Canadian business people — it is
not in the “DNA”, so to speak, but rather comes
down to the incentives embedded in the eco-
nomic environment.
Canadian business as a whole has been prof-
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— pre-tax business profit in Canada, as a per-
centage of GDP, has exceeded that of the
United States in most years since 1961. So the
behaviour of Canadian business is unlikely to
change unless its circumstances change.
Those circumstances are, in fact, changing
radically due not only to the current turmoil
in the world economy but, more fundamen-
tally in the long run, to a massive reallocation
of the share of global economic activity as
China and others become full participants in
world commerce. The demographics of the
Canadian business community are also chang-
ing as immigrants and a younger generation of
entrepreneurs, unencumbered by traditional
attitudes, expand their presence. So whether
by necessity or inclination, there is reason to
expect that Canadian business will become
more ambitious and innovative.
Sectoral Perspectives 
on Innovation
No one industry is “average” and there is no
one-size-fits-all explanation for Canada’s inno-
vation shortcomings. Four sectors — automo-
tive, life sciences, banking and ICT — were
chosen by the panel for “mini-case studies” to
illustrate the diversity of the innovation prob-
lematique in Canada and the variety of strategic
responses to it. Innovation also occurs in Can-
ada’s resource-based sectors though most
involves process improvements, the adaptation
of foreign-sourced M&E and techniques to
Canadian circumstances, mineral exploration,
and the financing and engineering of resource
projects at all scales. With very few exceptions,
Canadian firms have not been at the forefront
of innovation in capital equipment for resource
industries or in the development of the most
sophisticated materials and products derived
from the nation’s resources — further evidence
of Canada’s characteristic upstream, commod-
ity-oriented position in global value chains.
Following are summaries of the panel’s views
as to some of the lessons for business innovation
strategy in each of the four sectors.
The automotive industry — weak 
R&D but strong productivity
• The innovation strategies adopted by Cana-
dian auto sector firms have been influenced
heavily by structural characteristics — spe-
cifically the integration of the North Amer-
ican market and the role of foreign-
controlled assemblers. But the global suc-
cess of parts makers like Magna and
Linamar proves that ambitious Canadian
firms can expand from their base in a Can-
ada-U.S. supply chain to serve the world
market.
• Canada’s auto industry shows that it is possi-
ble to build a competitive industry without a
strong base of domestic R&D. The struc-
ture of the sector in Canada has instead led
to innovation strategies that focus on pro-
cess efficiency and workplace practices. This
raises the question as to whether public pol-
icies could be designed to foster more such
gains in productivity, including in resource
industries where process innovation is also
the prominent strategy. 
• Innovation policies in Canada should not
be focused only on the more typical mea-
sures such as R&D spending. These do
not adequately take into account the
Canadian context with its unusually high
reliance on sectors that are components of
global supply chains and that may not rely
on R&D spending to achieve greater pro-
ductivity.
• Canada’s automotive policy will need to
become more flexible and proactive. Foster-
ing Canadian-based innovation by both
vehicle assemblers and parts makers should
be a goal of a new Canadian auto strategy
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Life sciences — great promise but 
mixed results
• The strategies of life sciences companies are
strongly science-based and thus are heavily
influenced by public policies that support
R&D as well as research and training in uni-
versities. Public policies in respect of health
procurement and regulation are also of great
importance, particularly for multinational
pharmaceutical firms where there is fierce
competition among national affiliates for
innovation and product mandates. The
strategies of the smaller, biotechnology-
based companies are very heavily influenced
both by the availability of patient early-stage
finance and mentorship, and by their ability
to strike collaborative arrangements with
global pharmas.
• The experience of life sciences demon-
strates what can and cannot be accomplished
through a targeted government policy. The
federal government set out to generate
increased R&D spending in the life sciences
in Canada and it worked, but it has not yet
produced the expected follow-on benefits,
either of a growing pharmaceutical sector or
a clearly sustainable biotech industry.
• Additional protection of intellectual prop-
erty (IP) could strengthen Canada’s position
as an R&D location. But, more important is
the fact that, with the exception of Quebec,
governments do not view life sciences as a
genuinely high economic priority and thus
have not ensured that procurement practices
are harmonized with industry development
objectives.
• Canada’s single-payer health care system
creates an opportunity to establish a leading
role in using health innovation to improve
the productivity and quality of the health
care system. An exceptionally promising ini-
tiative is the partnership among the federal
and provincial/territorial governments
through Canada Health Infoway to acceler-
ate development of an electronic health
record.
Banking services — trade-off 
between stability and radical 
innovation
• The innovation strategies of the major
Canadian-owned banks strongly reflect the
nature of domestic competition which has
militated against a focus on product innova-
tion leadership, being content instead with
early adoption.
• The generally conservative banking and
regulatory practices prevailing in Canada
have kept Canadian banks off the “bleeding
edge” of innovation in the design and distri-
bution of the most sophisticated financial
instruments. This has substantially insu-
lated them from the global financial melt-
down and made Canada’s banks currently
among the world’s strongest (International
Monetary Fund, 2008 and World Economic
Forum, 2008).
• The success of Canadian banks over many
years may have dulled their business ambi-
tion. With limited exceptions, Canadian
banks were, until fairly recently, content to
focus on the domestic market and to restrict
their international activity primarily to
commodity-type wholesale banking as par-
ties to international lending consortia. Now
Canada’s banks have become more aggres-
sively and creatively outward-looking with
many examples of large investments to
establish a substantive presence abroad.
• The recent turmoil in the banking indus-
try globally has created a window of
opportunity for Toronto to become one of
the major North American, if not world-
wide, innovation centres for the financial
services industry. Canadian banks have
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as to where to locate their product and
service development, software program-
ming, data centres and other innovative
activities going forward. With the right
business climate, Toronto has the poten-
tial to emerge as a centre not only for
these activities, but also to attract special-
ists from around the world to create finan-
cial industry products and services.
ICT — A Catalytic Role for 
Government
The ICT sector is a heterogeneous collec-
tion of industries encompassing many differ-
ent innovation strategies as the following
examples illustrate.
• The fact that several large players in the
computer industry in Canada are foreign
controlled has not stunted Canada-based
product innovation activity, as has been the
case, for example, in the automotive indus-
try. The prospect of government procure-
ment contracts for ICT firms that
established a substantial presence in Canada
provided — notably in the case of IBM — an
initial attraction that grew into major activ-
ities with global product mandates. This
shows that government’s role as lead cus-
tomer can, under the right conditions, pro-
vide the impetus to kick-start a new
industry. The case of ICT procurement,
which catalyzed substantial economic devel-
opment, stands in contrast to the very differ-
ent philosophy of health sector
procurement that has prevailed for pharma-
ceutical products.
• Canada became an early leader in satellite and
microwave communications technology in
order to communicate across a vast geography,
a mission that was initially supported by tar-
geted government research and enterprise.
For example, Telesat was founded in 1969 as a
joint government-private-sector business.
• The climate for new ICT ventures (hard-
ware, software, systems and services) in
Canada has been quite favourable in view
of (i) a strong base of research and training
in universities and colleges, and in major
players like Nortel, IBM and RIM; (ii)
government supports such as the SR&ED
tax credit and various laboratories and
programs; and (iii) supportive clusters of
ICT subsector activity in several centres
across Canada. The many successes have
produced numerous role models and angel
investors, and bred confidence in young
ICT entrepreneurs that they could suc-
ceed in Canada. Business ambition has
been in ample supply although lack of a
strong base of leading-edge ICT custom-
ers in Canada continues to be a significant
drawback. Unfortunately, the sharp
decline in the telecommunications tech-
nology sector since 2001 (now exacer-
bated by the global recession) has hit
Canada particularly hard in view of this
country’s specialization in several of the
most heavily affected market segments.
Canada’s hard-won advantages are now at
risk.
A theme running strongly through the
foregoing examples is the key influence of
government, at least at the outset. The role
of government in ICT sectors has typically
been catalytic, enabling an innovative line of
activity to take root and to build scale to the
point where commercial viability has
emerged.
Addressing Canada’s Business 
Innovation Challenge
Canada has a serious productivity growth
problem. The panel believes that Canadians
should be concerned about the productivity of
our export-oriented economy as competition
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intensifies. The panel also believes that Canadi-
ans should be concerned about the long-run
consequences of continued weak productivity
performance in the domestic economy as the
population ages and competition intensifies
among the mature economies for the best
human skills, and particularly for entrepreneur-
ial talent.
Because Canada’s productivity problem is actually
a business innovation problem, the discussion
about what has to be done to improve productiv-
ity in Canada needs to focus on the factors that
encourage, or discourage, the adoption of inno-
vation-based business strategies. This is a com-
plex challenge because the mix of relevant
factors varies from sector to sector and requires
a broader conception of innovation than the
conventional R&D-centred view, which, while
important, is far too limiting.
Because there is no single cause of the innova-
tion problem in Canada, nor any one-size-fits-
all remedy, public policy needs to be informed
by a deep understanding of the factors that influ-
ence business decision makers, sector by sector.
This clearly requires extensive consultation with
business people themselves as well as the further
development of innovation surveys and other
forms of micro-analysis of the innovation pro-
cess.
Overarching the sector-specific factors that
influence innovation strategies are certain issues
of pervasive influence identified in the panel’s
analysis that suggest the need for proactive pub-
lic policies to:
• encourage investment in advanced M&E in
general, and in ICT in particular (such
incentives should be designed only in light
of a more thorough understanding of the
reasons for the relatively slow adoption of
ICT in Canada to date);
• sharpen the incentive for innovation-ori-
ented business strategies by increasing
exposure to competition and by promoting a
stronger export orientation on the part of
Canadian firms, particularly in goods and
services that are downstream in the value
chain and thus close to end-users;
• improve the climate for new ventures so as
to better translate opportunities arising
from Canada’s university research excel-
lence into viable Canadian-based growth
businesses, bearing in mind that better
early-stage financing and experienced men-
torship hold the key; and
• support areas of particular Canadian
strength and opportunity through focused,
sector-oriented strategies, such as was done
in the past in, for example, the automotive,
aerospace and ICT industries.
Fortunately, the many successes of Canadian
businesses in the hyper-competitive global mar-
ketplace show that there is nothing innate or
inevitable in the national character that prevents
Canada’s businesses from being just as innova-
tive and productive as those of other nations.
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